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ABSTRACT 
 Industrial control systems (ICSs) provide important services in national critical 
infrastructure but are increasingly the subject of cyberattacks. The need for ease of 
maintenance and operational convenience encourages using cloud services, increasing 
their security vulnerabilities, and knowing what threats to expect that would help in 
defending cloud-based ICSs. This thesis tested an ICS honeypot (decoy system) called 
GridPot that was deployed in a third-party cloud environment and simulated a microgrid 
distribution system. We compared data from a GridPot instance deployed on an in-house 
server with three cloud-deployed GridPot instances with varying configurations. Overall 
results showed that the cloud-deployed GridPots had comparable traffic to the non-cloud 
GridPot, but it yielded less ICS-specific traffic, though what occurred appeared more 
deliberate. Nearly all attacks on the cloud-deployed GridPots showed little sophistication 
about ICS protocols. Our results further confirmed that cloud-based honeypot owners 
must maintain awareness of cloud service providers that recycle IP addresses to avoid 
exploits on previously used IP addresses. We conclude that ICS honeypots in the cloud 
are an effective tool for collecting cyberattack intelligence, and they do not appear to 
discourage attacks by being in the cloud. 
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This thesis addresses the defense of industrial control systems (ICSs) for the 
National Cyber Strategy. The work developed methods to identify threats to ICSs by 
operating honeypots (decoys) in a cloud network and analyzing their attack data. We 
analyzed the collected data to determine whether a cloud deployment discouraged 
attackers, whether it was more resilient to attacks than a traditional network, and whether 
it could support analysis of attacks. The Navy relies on critical infrastructure; these results 
can help protect this infrastructure and aid in decision-making for systems used by the 
Navy in defense platforms, and shipyards in support of SECNAVINST 3501.1D. 
A. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE CLOUD 
ICSs are used in many applications, most notably for critical infrastructure such as 
water-distribution networks, electricity generation and distribution, oil refineries, nuclear 
plants, building management, and public transportation systems (Tesfahun & Bhaskari, 
2016). Because of their original physical isolation as well as their logical isolation from 
digital networks, security was not initially difficult for these systems (Antón et al., 2017). 
Today, ICSs rely on widespread TCP/IP (transmission control protocol/internet protocol) 
network products rather than the proprietary protocols and specialized products (hardware 
and software) used previously (Stouffer et al., 2015), this change has reduced system 
downtime and simplified configuration (Centre For The Protection of National 
Infrastructure, 2010). Although remote network access to control systems that monitor or 
alter processes is convenient, it opens ICSs to many Internet-based attacks (Antón et al., 
2017). In the last few years, industries have started integrating cloud-computing services 
into ICSs. Cloud computing provides on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources including networks, servers, software, and services (Combs, 2020). 
With cloud-based systems, operating costs are reduced. The growth in ICSs, including 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems responsible for remotely 
accessing local control modules for operational control and data collection, has encouraged 
interest in adopting cloud technology. Market research estimated that in 2019 the global 
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SCADA market size exceeded 30 billion U.S. dollars and will grow over 7.5% in the next 
six years, attributing most growth to the increasing adoption of cloud-based SCADA and 
infrastructural development (Bhutani & Wadhwani, 2020). An example of the trend is 
Vipond Controls, which has developed iSCADA, a remote SCADA system with a local 
interface. iSCADA is available as a service on Vipond’s server cloud and allows customers 
to access virtual machines that can monitor and control assets remotely, including changing 
controllers and troubleshooting processes (Combs, 2020). iSCADA was used by an oil and 
natural gas exploration company to bring 300 wells online in a single month (Gavin, 2018).  
To further assess the adoption of cloud services for industrial control systems, we used 
the Sentient Hyper-Optimized Data Access Network (SHODAN), a Web-based tool that 
discovers and classifies devices connected to the Internet (Shodan, n.d.). We searched it for IP 
addresses associated with TCP port 2404, which is uniquely associated with the Telecontrol 
Equipment and Systems protocol IEC 104 (Matousek, 2017), the protocol of focus for our 
thesis. Searching just the cloud servers of DigitalOcean, the provider used for this thesis, it 
found 237 addresses worldwide. Many more probably exist under other cloud servers.  
B. ATTACKS ON INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
ICSs have long been targeted by attackers. In 2006, a remote hacker installed 
malicious software on a water filtration system in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, severely 
affecting plant operations (National Service Center for Environmental Publications 
[NSCEP], 2012). In 2015, the BlackEnergy malware campaign compromised the systems 
of three energy distribution companies in Ukraine, by seizing control of SCADA systems, 
remotely shutting down substations, disabling infrastructure components, and temporarily 
disrupting power to over 225,000 customers (Beach-Westmoreland & Stycynski, 2019). In 
2016, the Ukraine electric grid was attacked again with malware called Crashoverride, 
exploiting the IEC104 protocol, targeting Internet-connected human-machine interfaces; it 
deenergized a Kiev transmission substation, causing outages (Dragos Inc., 2017). In 
December 2019, an ICS of the Bahrain Oil Company Bapco was attacked with malware 
called DUSTMAN, which was designed to overwrite data (Kaspersky, 2020). The attacker 
exploited a remote execution vulnerability on a virtual private network, harvested 
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credentials, and distributed its malware throughout the network. In December 2019, ICS 
ransomware called EKANS (snake backward) was discovered in a commercial malware 
repository (Dragos Inc., 2020). Besides encrypting files as is typical in ransomware, 
EKANS stopped specific ICS processes on a “kill-list” including data-historian clients as 
well as user interfaces and possibly control systems.  
Honeypots are sites deliberately designed to be attacked. ICS honeypots can operate 
to look like a real ICS to lure attackers from production networks or to collect attack methods 
without exposing real network resources (Gjermundrød & Dionysiou, 2015). The cloud 
environment permits easier construction of honeypots by an economy of scale; users can 
configure multiple virtual machines for honeypots from a pool of IP addresses and run them 
on the same local network. Cloud services can allow users to place honeypots in different 
geographical locations to see more diversity of traffic (Chandra & Madhuri, 2012, p. 6). 
However, moving ICSs to a cloud environment increases their vulnerability. ICS 
cloud services are exposed to attack protocols and are not designed for security but have 
been used in control systems for decades with few software updates (Antón et al., 2017). 
These factors, combined with easily available exploitation tools and reconnaissance 
services like SHODAN, make it easy to quickly exploit existing vulnerabilities to attack 
ICS cloud systems. On the other hand, that means that ICS honeypots can collect much 
useful intelligence about attacks. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II examines previous work on cloud configurations, power grid systems, 
ICS architecture, and honeypots. Chapter III describes the architecture of our cloud-based 
ICS honeypot. It also describes microgrid power systems, Conpot and GridPot 
architectures and protocols, and the GridLAB-D power-system simulator. Chapter IV 
describes our research methodology, giving configuration specifics for cloud deployment 
of each honeypot, alterations made to the default templates to make our honeypots less 
obvious, and data collection and network analysis methods. Chapter V shows and discusses 
the results. Chapter VI states conclusions.  
4 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. CLOUD DELIVERY MODELS 
Three delivery models for a cloud environment are Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS) (Bokhari et al., 
2016, pp. 890–892). IaaS uses virtual machines only for hardware resources like servers, 
networks, and operating systems; the client manages the operating system, data, and 
software. SaaS, also called cloud application services, runs applications remotely; a license 
is provided to the client to access the software. PaaS provides basic services such as 
databases and programming tools remotely and is primarily used for program development.  
Three primary cloud configurations are private, public, and hybrid (Tinankoria & 
Babak, 2017). Private cloud services are hosted at an owning organization and maintained 
by them. Public cloud services are hosted off-site, usually by a commercial entity. Hybrid 
cloud services interconnect local resources with off-site resources.  
Cloud services provide multi-tenancy, scalability, and elasticity for all delivery 
model levels (Lehrig et al., 2015, p.83). Multi-tenancy allows the sharing of the same 
computing services among many users (Morsy et al., 2010). Scalability permits the 
allocation of existing resources to maintain performance when the workload increases. It 
is particularly useful for service models where clients have many processes like honeypots 
operating simultaneously. Elasticity permits rapid expansion and contraction as necessary 
of computing capacity from the cloud service provider, matching the current demand with 
the minimum required resources. It helps systems handling bursts of traffic, or a customer 
minimizing the computing power they require for their processes. Cloud systems can also 
provide off-site emergency data back-ups, data-analytics, development, data storage, and 
system monitoring and control (Piggin, 2015). All these features help ICSs. 
Several security issues occur with cloud implementations. Moving outdated legacy 
systems to cloud-based architectures exposes vulnerabilities to a large audience. It also 
requires relying on service providers as well to safeguard proprietary information, and 
vulnerabilities in the service provider’s infrastructure can cause system compromise 
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outside of the client’s control (Gonzales et al., 2017, p.523). The security of a cloud system 
depends on installed security applications, sharing permissions between tenants, 
hypervisor protection measures, and the level of protection provided to the user by the 
cloud service provider, which makes security more complex than with a standalone 
application. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) provides 
standards related to requirements of accessibility, interoperability, performance, 
portability, and security of cloud services (National Institute of Standards and Testing 
[NIST], 2013), but not all cloud services follow them.  
B. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
ICSs combine control components to run infrastructure processes. Two common 
types are distributed control systems (DCS) and supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems (Stouffer et al., 2015). DCSs control automated production systems 
within a geographic area; often they integrate with corporate networks so management can 
observe production. SCADA systems oversee controllers of a production cycle of a 
localized process. Feedback or feed-forward control loops maintain processes around a 
desired “set point.” Figure 1 shows a typical configuration of a remotely operated SCADA 
system. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are often used in DCS and SCADA 
systems to locally manage a process through feedback-control loops. They can also operate 
partly independently as they have programmable memory to execute instructions. PLCs 




Figure 1. A typical SCADA configuration 
A power grid also called an electric-utility network, sends electrical power from 
power plants to users (American Public Power Association [APPA], n.d.). This process has 
three phases: generation, transmission, and distribution. Electricity is created by 
generation, then the voltage is stepped up in voltage by a transformer for transmission. 
Distribution steps down the transmitted voltage and distributes it to users through 
distribution lines and transformers. Our thesis simulates a 13-house power-grid distribution 
system that communicates using the IEC 104 protocol.  
C. HONEYPOTS 
Honeypots detect reconnaissance attempts, analyze traffic, and deflect attacks from 
real networks to collect information about attack methods. This is done by using software 
that imitates the behavior of the desired target system. Honeypots have no production value 
and are solely intended to encourage reconnaissance and attack activity (Redwood et al., 
2015). Honeypots can be virtualized or physical (Provos, 2008). Using many honeypots on 
a network with different configurations will attract different kinds of attackers. Figure 2 




Figure 2. A typical honeypot deployment alongside a production system 
Honeypots can be high-interaction, medium-interaction, and low-interaction. Low-
interaction honeypots are less resource-intensive and allow the attacker to interact only 
with limited simulated services and static data. Medium-interaction honeypots provide 
some feedback to commands issued by an attacker but offer limited applications and 
resources to interact with; they allow a better understanding of attack methods than low-
interaction honeypots. High-interaction honeypots allow intruders to access a nearly 
complete set of applications and resources on a system. A high-interaction honeypot will 
be more responsive and can entice attackers to spend more time interacting with it 
(Khoshnaw, 2017). For our thesis, we used the medium-interaction honeypot GridPot 
(Sk4ld, 2015) to emulate a power grid system using the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol (IEC 
104) for device-to-device communications (Matousek, 2017) and the Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) for Web client communications. GridPot did not provide an interactive 
Web-based user control interface but did provide an HTTP system status page accessible 
by Web-based browsers, and it responded to IEC 104 protocol messages when they were 
sent to port 2404 of the cloud server.  
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D. PREVIOUS ICS HONEYPOTS 
In this section we discuss several previous ICS honeypot projects. 
One honeypot project ran a large-scale low-interaction ICS honeypot using the 
Amazon EC2 cloud service for 28 days (Serbanescu et al., 2015, pp.21-25). It serviced 
several protocols including Modbus, the Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), the Inter-
Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP), the ICS protocol IEC 104, the Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) (v1/2/3), the Trivial File Transfer Protocol 
(TFTP), and the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP). Interactions were 
either connection attempts or protocol-based requests. Modbus interactions were 15% of 
the interactions and IEC 104 interactions were .002%. SNMP had the most interactions 
with 85% of traffic. The honeypot did not respond to IEC 104 traffic. The researchers 
observed that being indexed by SHODAN increased reconnaissance attempts.  
Another SCADA honeypot tried to entice attackers to use high-value or new attacks 
on SCADA ICS systems (Redwood et al., 2015). It was a realistic high-interaction 
honeypot that modified the Conpot honeypot (Conpot, n.d.). They used the IEC 61850 
protocol as a wrapper for a less secure Modbus protocol called GOOSE and the 
Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocol communicating between devices. 
Attacker activity came through a Web-based user interface on port 80. The honeypot also 
interfaced to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s electrical-power simulator 
GridLAB-D (Gridlabd.org, 2020) that allowed attackers to think they could manipulate 
voltage flow and other electrical settings. The honeypot appeared to be effective at enticing 
attackers to interact using high value or zero-day exploits.  
Another honeypot project simulated the operations of electrical companies (Barak, 
2020). It mimicked an electrical provider’s network with an information-technology 
environment including a data network, an operational-technology environment operating 
physical processes and machinery, and a controller interface. Soon after launch, it was 
subject to ransomware attacks. They were done by exhaustively guessing the username and 
password of a remote administration interface used for troubleshooting. The attacker 
executed a PowerShell script to create a backdoor to maintain persistence, and several 
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exploits were uploaded, including credential-stealing tools that allowed attackers to move 
through the network. The same project launched a similar honeypot later, and it was 
compromised too (Barak, 2020). Attackers installed backdoors by creating additional user 
accounts, in preparation for selling access to it. Malware was also installed including 
crypto-miners, and the honeypot was used for phishing and distributed denial-of-service 
attempts.  
Q-GridPot is a commercially available network-appliance honeypot designed to 
model electric-power grids (Quantalytics, 2019). It uses GridPot to create a fake power-
grid infrastructure. It can also create customizable operator interfaces with a realistic 
appearance. It comes with network intrusion-detection systems, packet-capture tools, and 
forensic software, as well as tools to defend against attacks.  
A project at NPS ran GridPot with GridLAB-D simulation software (Kendrick & 
Rucker, 2019). It collected data for 19 days, exposing the protocols HTTP, S7 
Communications, SNMP, and Modbus to outside traffic. SHODAN correctly identified it 
as a honeypot when it used site history but could not otherwise identify it. It attracted a 
wide array of traffic, totaling 1,525,059 packets and 165 megabytes of data, much of which 
was scanning and attack-related. This research showed that attackers will exploit Web-
based SCADA vulnerabilities on an externally facing connection.  
Another project at NPS used the Conpot honeypot to find indications of 
compromise (Hyun, 2018). It parsed log data to identify protocols being attacked and 
countries of origin as well as the content of attack packets. It analyzed logs of the eight 
default protocols provided by Conpot: EtherNet/IP, the Communication Industrial Protocol 
(CIP), HTTP, S7 communications, the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI), 
SNMP, the Building Automation and Control Networking Protocol (BACnet), and 
Modbus. HTTP was the primary protocol seen, with Modbus being second and being 
repeatedly targeted by a small pool of IP addresses on specific days. S7 Communications 
was the third most used protocol, and BACnet, IPMI, SNMP, and EtherNet/IP were used 
significantly less. Conpot appeared to be a good way to extract indicators of compromise, 
even though it is a low-interaction honeypot. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
This chapter discusses the design and construction of our experiment. We also 
describe the cloud hosting of our honeypots, and how we deployed and operated them. 
More specific details of our configuration and implementation are in Chapter 4.  
A. OVERALL FRAMEWORK 
Our experiment used a virtual machine containing an instance of GridPot created 
by Dougherty (Dougherty, 2020) and deployed it three ways in a cloud environment. The 
goal was to compare data of the deployment methods for IEC 104 and HTTP traffic. We 
wished to determine differences in the quantity, type, or source location of traffic. 
B. DIGITALOCEAN CLOUD ENVIRONMENT 
Our experiment needed an IaaS cloud service with adequate resources to run 
different GridPot instances as well as the Conpot and GridLAB-D applications. We 
considered Amazon Web Service (AWS) and DigitalOcean (DO) as potential platforms. 
Campus information-technology specialists told us that Amazon Web Service discourages 
the running of security applications such as penetration testing and honeypots, and 
DigitalOcean was cheaper for the same services, so we chose the latter. 
The DigitalOcean cloud platform provided us with control over resources (memory, 
processing power, and storage), a choice of the operating system, snapshots and regular 
backups, remote console access, firewall control, and options for international deployment 
(Digital Ocean, 2020b). DigitalOcean provides a virtual server platform which they call a 
“droplet.” We used three droplets to host three GridPot instances. Of the four droplet plans 
available (basic, general-purpose, CPU-optimized, and memory-optimized), we chose a 
general-purpose droplet plan which gave us increased processing power on a dedicated 
CPU, more memory, and ample storage (Digital Ocean, 2020a). This permitted copying 
Dougherty’s Ethernet-based honeypot to a virtualized cloud environment. The ability to 
create snapshots and regular backups allowed the quick restoration of a droplet should it 
crash or become compromised. We deployed and operated the honeypots remotely with 
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“droplet consoles.” Each droplet has a built-in DigitalOcean firewall to control inbound 
and outbound traffic. DigitalOcean has international servers in North America, Asia, and 
Europe, we used the North America and Asia servers for our experiments.  
C. CONPOT 
GridPot requires Conpot, a low-interaction ICS honeypot that uses an internal IEC 
104 server, which interfaced with GridLAB-D, a simulator of an electrical grid (Conpot, 
n.d.). Conpot provides templates for several protocols and services including IEC 104, 
GridPot, Kamstrup_32, and Guardian_AST. Although IEC 104 was available in Conpot, 
we used the GridPot template for it because it was used by Dougherty. Our experiments 
only collected data on HTTP and IEC 104 traffic. 
D. GRIDPOT 
GridPot is a two-layer honeypot that simulates an ICS for an electrical grid 
(Redwood et al., 2015). The GridPot implementation in our experiment included Conpot 
and GridLAB-D (Figure 3). Conpot controlled the honeypot layer while GridLAB-D 
controlled the electrical-grid modeling. GridPot is freely available on-line. Our experiment 
used an earlier version of GridPot that had been modified for Dougherty’s work. Client 
access to the GridPot came in through the Conpot on ports 80 and 2404. Changes to the 
simulated data were sent to GridLAB-D simulation and status changes were returned to the 
client through Conpot.  
E. DOUGHERTY’S WORK 
Our GridPot implementation came from the work of (Dougherty, 2020) and his 
Phase 1 in particular. GridPot provided limited attacker interaction on an ICS protocol 
interface, which Dougherty’s work called “low fidelity.” Therefore, Dougherty created an 
additional layer of obscurity by having GridPot communicate with GridLAB-D, which 
would emulate an ICS system. The intent was to create a more interactive honeypot, which 




Figure 3. Basic GridPot architecture 
F. GRIDLAB-D 
GridPot uses GridLAB-D, open-source software for simulating power distribution, 
that receives IEC 104 change requests from Conpot to modify the simulation parameters, 
and returns updated simulation data to Conpot (Gridlabd.org, 2020). GridLAB-D contains 
over 40 simulation models ranging from water heaters to wind turbines. Our GridPot 
implementation used the IEEE 13-Node Model with Houses simulation (Figure 4), It 
emulated a microgrid, an isolated electric grid for power transmission and distribution 
(Lantero, 2014). The model emulated a microgrid with switches, voltage regulators, power 
transformers, and end-users.  
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Figure 4. The IEEE 13-node model with houses. Source: Dougherty (2020) 
G. RELEVANT PROTOCOLS 
1. HTTP  
Most traffic we saw with our honeypots was of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP). It is an application-level protocol that communicates between Web-based clients 
and Web servers through TCP port 80 (Fielding et al., 1999). A client uses different HTTP 
methods to request various resources from the server. The HTTP methods seen in our 
results were OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST, PROPFIND AND CONNECT. OPTION 
returns communications options for a specific resource. GET returns a specified resource. 
HEAD is like GET except that its response contains information about the specified 
resource, not the actual resource. POST sends input from the client to the server. 
PROPFIND retrieves properties from the resource. (Dusseault, 2007). CONNECT 
establishes a tunnel between the client and the server resource.  
2. IEC 60870-5-104 
IEC 60870-5-104 is an application-level protocol, often called IEC 104 for short, 
for ICS communication through port 2404 (Matousek, 2017). IEC 104 remotely controls 
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equipment and systems with three types of Application Protocol Control Information 
(APCI) frames, called format frames in this thesis: I-format, S-format, and U-format. I-
format frames transfer information including instructions between a controlling station and 
a controlled device, and contain an important subpart called an Application Service Data 
Unit (ASDU) (Figure 5). S-format frames execute supervisory functions from a controlling 
station to the controlled device and acknowledgments in return. U-format frames execute 
control functions from a controlling station to a controlled station and contain an ASDU. 
Herein, these three frame types are also referred to as I-frame, S-frame, and U-frame. In 
our experiments, the IEC 104 server in Conpot received I-format and U-format frames. 
Data was then transferred from the server to and from GridLAB-D for simulation control 
and monitoring (Figure 3). Dougherty’s work allowed the attacker to make detailed 
manipulation within the IEC 104 protocol, and our experiments took it further by changing 
the environment and implementation methods.  
 
Figure 5. ASDU structure. Source: Matousek (2017) 
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IV. EXPERIMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter discusses experiment configuration and implementation, data 
collection, and data analysis. The research had three experiments with different cloud 
implementations as described in Section IV.A. The data analysis methods are described in 
Section IV.C. The results of our analysis are in Chapter V.  
A. CONFIGURATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
We conducted three experiments with different deployment methods (Figure 6). 
We compared the data from these experiments with Dougherty’s data as indicated by a 
dashed line. The droplet resources, operating system, and software were consistent 
throughout the experiments. Each of the three environments was created in a DigitalOcean 
“droplet” or virtual machine (DigitalOcean, 2020a) using DigitalOcean’s pre-built Ubuntu 
Linux 18.04 (LTS) x64 image.  
 
Figure 6. Experiment structure 
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All three experiments used DigitalOcean general-purpose droplets with a dedicated 
CPU, 16GB memory, and 50GB solid-state disk (SSD) storage. Each droplet had a single 
unique outward-facing IP address. We accessed droplets with a DigitalOcean console at its 
website and by using secure-shell protocol (SSH) from local devices. During testing, a 
DigitalOcean firewall blocked inbound traffic to the GridPot process. During live 
implementation, the firewall permitted inbound traffic on SSH port 22, HTTP port 80, and 
IEC 104 port 2404.  
Experiment 1 used Dougherty’s Phase 1 deployment (Dougherty, 2020) as 
modified slightly for a cloud environment. The purpose of Experiment 1 was to compare 
traffic between a physical deployment and a cloud deployment. While installation required 
additional dependencies for cloud operation as described in Section IV.D, the GridPot code 
was the same as in Dougherty’s. Before Experiment 1, we confirmed the SSH, HTTP, and 
IEC 104 ports were open by a network-mapper (Nmap) scan of its IP address.  
Experiment 2 was like Experiment 1 except for several code changes to data 
constants within the template files that were intended to better simulate power-grid 
components and make it less obvious as a honeypot. We again confirmed that the SSH, 
HTTP, and IEC 104 ports were open using Nmap and we also confirmed that port 2404 
had valid IEC 104 responses. We ran test interactions to confirm that the HTTP responses 
correctly reflected the modified code. 
Experiment 3 was like Experiment 2 except for being deployed in Asia. We 
performed similar confirmations on ports before deployment.  
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Data was collected from 17 August 2020 to 03 September 2020 (17 days) for 
Experiment 1 and from 16 September 2020 to 04 October 2020 (18 Days) for Experiments 
2 and 3, which were run simultaneously. Data was collected using packet-capture (PCAP) 
software and Conpot logs.  
Besides our packet captures, which collected complete packets on all HTTP and 
IEC 104 traffic, we got packet captures from Dougherty’s Phase 1 research with Wireshark 
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software (Wireshark · Go Deep., n.d.). His data was collected for just HTTP and IEC 104. 
We used Tshark, a terminal-oriented version of Wireshark (D.2. Tshark: Terminal-Based 
Wireshark, n.d.). Packet capturing was configured to roll over into a new file every 25 
MBs, but this created difficulty for transfer to repositories. Some repositories had a 
maximum file upload size of 10 MBs; therefore, we recommend limiting the file size to 
less than 10 MBs.  
Conpot logs were also collected. They are text files that log and timestamp 
honeypot-layer activity from when Conpot is initialized until it is either brought down or 
crashes. They include session starts, session timeouts, HTTP responses, IP addresses, client 
details, I-format frame data, and U-format frame data. Conpot logs can also be used as a 
backup if packet data is missing for a period. An example Conpot log is given in Figure 7. 
It shows the initialization of the Conpot and the first HTTP session established.  
 
Figure 7. Conpot log example 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
For each experiment, all packet captures were combined into a single file in time 
order. A Python parser, written by Dougherty, extracted relevant data and stored it in data 
frames. This included information about HTTP sessions, HTTP method requests, IEC 104 
sessions, IEC 104 messages, IEC 104 errors, and IP geolocation information. We then used 
Jupyter Notebook to calculate statistical data for our analysis. Another parser counted 
HTTP/IEC 104 sessions, HTTP/IEC104 method types, unique IP addresses, IP location 
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data, and IEC 104 format frame data in the packet captures. Conpot logs were used in our 
analysis to recognize I-format and U-format frame traffic from Shodan and other probes. 
D. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
The initial installation of GridPot on the cloud server encountered several build 
errors caused by missing Python packages. After installing the required packages, we were 
able to successfully create a GridPot instance on the cloud server. The missing Python 
packages were: pytest, pluggy, text-unicode, appdirs, ipaddress, and greenery. 
During Experiment 1, a Virtual Network Computing (VNC) desktop environment 
ran on top of the Ubuntu Linux 18.04 (LTS) operating system for our convenience. This 
environment let us remotely log in to the server and open several terminal instances at a 
time. However, in Experiment 1 the VNC interface stopped working, and we had to use 
the default terminal console provided by the operating system. When invoked from the 
console, the bash command to open additional terminal instances did not work, so we 
executed our programs as background processes. This also required us to switch our packet 
capture software to Tshark as Wireshark required a desktop environment for installation.  
When we initialized GridPot, Conpot, and Tshark as background processes through 
a secure shell connection, they were suspended when the secure-shell session ended, which 
was undesirable because a honeypot must work continuously. As a work-around, Conpot, 
GridPot, and Tshark were initialized from the droplet console on DigitalOcean. The secure 
shell was only used for system monitoring, data collection, and data transfer.  
During Experiments 2 and 3, Nmap IEC 104 probe results initially did not reflect 
the honeypot code changes we made. We found that Conpot needed to be re-initialized for 
the code changes to take effect. Re-initialization required running Conpot’s setup script 
(setup.py), which created the corresponding runtime image and placed it in the build 
library. That image was used when initializing Conpot.  
A goal of our experiments was to fool Shodan into believing that our experiments 
were real ICS systems. To measure this, we used the Shodan command line interface tool 
Honeyscore, which uses data from known honeypots to create criteria to identify additional 
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honeypots. Our Experiments 2 and 3 returned a score of 0.0 stating they were not honeypots 
However, we discovered that Honeyscore had been developed for a specific project and 
had not been updated recently and should not be used as a measure of honeypot 
detectability, most of the code has now been rolled into the regular honeypot detection 
mechanism used on SHODAN’s website (J. Matherly, personal communication, October 
21, 2020).  
E. CONPOT SETUP  
For an initial test, we installed a Conpot on a virtual machine using VirtualBox and 
Ubuntu 18.04. We then successfully created a cloud version on DigitalOcean to develop 
skills with installation methods in the cloud using DigitalOcean. Thanks to the success of 
Dougherty’s GridPot research, we abandoned the Conpot setup and created the more 
powerful cloud-based GridPot implementation described earlier.  
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This chapter discusses our observations from our cloud-based experiments.  
Table 1 shows traffic statistics collected for all experiments used during our 
analysis. 
Table 1. Overall comparison of traffic for all experiments 
 Dougherty 
Phase 1 
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Number of days 157 17 18 18 
Number of unique countries 126 67 66 72 
Number of unique IP addresses 2820 541 652 3750 
Total number of requests 27021 5564 3728 28509 
Total HTTP requests 26368 5376 3698 28485 
Total IEC 104 messages 653 188 28 24 
Total IEC 104 malformed messages 557 171 13 14 
Total IEC 104 valid messages 96 17 17 10 
Mean HTTP requests per day 239.714 298.672 194.634 1499.21 
Min HTTP requests per day 1 51 27 815 
Max HTTP requests per day 2191 2438 1123 2820 
Mean IEC 104 messages per day 10.532 10.444 2.55 2.667 
Min IEC 104 messages per day 1 7 1 1 
Max IEC 104 messages per day 130 16 6 9 
Mean valid IEC 104 requests per day 2.341 2.429 3.0 2.0 
Minvalid IEC 104 messages per day 1 1 1 1 
Maxvalid IEC 104 messages per day 8 6 4 3 
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Experiment 1 was indexed by SHODAN within the first day of operation, showing 
ports 22, 80, 2404, and 5901 as open and correctly identifying it as an ICS honeypot. 
SHODAN only reported ports 22 and 80 as open for Experiments 2 and 3, possibly due to 
historical indexing data. Experiment 3 received IEC 104 messages from an IP address 
associated with SHODAN, but port 2404 was not reported as open on SHODAN’s website 
during the experiment. Figure 8 shows Experiment 1 daily HTTP traffic, IEC 104 traffic, 
and valid IEC 104 message counts, and is representative of traffic received during the other 
experiments.  
 
Figure 8. Experiment 1 HTTP and ICS daily traffic 
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A. SESSION DATA 
Sessions were defined as all packets exchanged by a socket (site) pair on a given 
date (as with Dougherty). We counted the number of addresses that established a single 
HTTP-only session, those that established multiple HTTP sessions, those that established 
a single ICS (IEC 104) session, those that established multiple ICS sessions, and those that 
established both HTTP and ICS sessions (see Table 2). The total number of sessions in this 
table does not equal the count in “HTTP only sessions” plus the count in “Multiple HTTP 
sessions” because each IP address could have multiple HTTP sessions, and we only record 
the number of IP addresses establishing multiple sessions. 










Days 157 17 18 18 
Total Number of 
Addresses Seen 
2820 541 652 3750 
Number of HTTP-
Only Sessions 
2747 506 640 3740 
Number of Multiple 
HTTP Sessions 
548 118 127 2464 
Number of ICS-Only 
Sessions 
53 4 9 8 
Number of Multiple-
ICS Sessions 
32 1 3 3 
Number of Both 
HTTP and ICS 
Sessions 
20 31 3 3 
Total Number of 
Sessions 
7121 1811 1515 21474 
 
26 
1. More About Sessions 
Figure 9 compares the number of IP addresses that connected to our honeypots for 
a single HTTP-only session, multiple HTTP-only sessions, and those that connected to the 
ICS IEC 104 server at least once (“Other”).  
 
Figure 9. Session statistics per IP address 
Table 3 shows the reported source country distribution of HTTP sessions. 
Unsurprisingly, the United States was in the top three of all experiments, and China and 
Russia appeared in the top ten of US-based experiments while Russia did not appear in the 
Asia-based experiment and China was seventh. 
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Table 3. Distribution of top 10 countries with HTTP sessions 
Dougherty Phase 1 Experiment 1 Experiment 2  Experiment 3 
 Country 
Percentage 
of Total Country 
Percentage 
of Total Country 
Percentage 
of Total Country 
Percentage 
of Total 









States 16.5 Russia 16 China 16.5 Singapore 13.5 
3 Russia 12.3 China 9.1 Russia 10.7 Canada 4.9 
4 Taiwan 4.7 Germany 6.4 Netherlands 6.4 Netherlands 4.6 
5 Brazil 3.8 Netherlands 3.2 
United 
Kingdom 5.4 France 4.5 
6 Netherlands 3.6 Brazil 2.6 India 3 Germany 3.4 
7 Germany 3 Romania 2.4 Brazil 2.3 China 2.3 
8 Japan 1.8 Seychelles 2.2 Germany 1.9 Italy 2.1 
9 India 1.7 India 1.8 France 1.7 Sweden 2.1 
10 Canada 1.6 Switzerland 1.2 Romania 1.7 
United 
Kingdom 2 
11 Other 28.5 Other 14.5 Other 15.9 Other 19.6 
 
We also analyzed the ICS (IEC 104) sessions. Figure 10 shows the number of IP 
addresses establishing a single ICS session, IP addresses with multiple ICS sessions 
without an HTTP session, and those establishing both HTTP and ICS sessions.  
 
Figure 10. ICS sessions statistics 
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In Experiment 1, all the ICS traffic from addresses with dual HTTP and ICS 
sessions was incorrectly formatted IEC 104 messages; they had HTTP format although 
they were sent to the IEC 104 port 2404. An example is in Figure 11. This appears to be 
brute-force vulnerability scanning without regard to protocol format.  
 
Figure 11. Error traffic sent to the ICS server 
Table 4 shows counts of U-format, I-format, error frames, and total IEC traffic. 
Dougherty Phase 1 and Experiment 1 received more error frames than the other 
experiments. Table 5 shows daily ICS statistics for total IEC 104 traffic and valid-format 
IEC 104 traffic. Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 ICS method counts differed, which could 
be due to SHODAN identifying Experiment 1 as a cloud ICS honeypot early, resulting in 
increased traffic. The code changes used in Experiments 2 and 3 to make the honeypot less 
obvious may have actually discouraged ICS interactions. 






Error Frames Total IEC traffic 
Dougherty 78 19 557 654 
Experiment 1 13 4 171 188 
Experiment 2 11 4 13 28 
Experiment 3 8 2 14 24 
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Table 5. Daily IEC 104 traffic 
 Total IEC 104 Traffic Valid IEC 104 Traffic 
Experiment Mean Min Max Std. Dev Mean Min Max Std. Dev 
Dougherty 10.532 0 130 27.749 2.341 0 8 1.676 
Experiment 1 10.444 0 16 2.733 2.429 0 6 1.678 
Experiment 2 2.545 0 6 1.827 3.0 0 4 1.095 
Experiment 3 2.667 0 9 2.539 2.0 0 3 0.894 
 
A list of addresses used for these joint HTTP and ICS sessions is given in Table 6. 
The increase in this kind of traffic over Dougherty’s implementation suggests a U.S. cloud 
deployment is more attractive to indiscriminate attackers. Experiments 2 and 3 did not 
experience the same increased level as Experiment 1. Table 7 shows the distribution of 
countries establishing ICS sessions. 





Count Country AS Organization 
46.101.218.101 2 4 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
46.101.237.230 1 3 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
46.101.242.159 1 6 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
46.101.244.9 1 2 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
46.101.248.32 11 5 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
104.248.130.250 5 11 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
104.248.132.111 7 14 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
104.248.134.171 11 23 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
104.248.142.114 6 10 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
104.248.242.91 1 5 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
104.248.248.56 5 10 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
104.248.252.252 9 19 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
122.228.19.79 2 1 China 
Wenzhou, Zhejiang 
Province, P.R. China 
134.122.69.254 3 5 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
134.122.93.160 5 4 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.144.212 2 4 Netherlands Digital Ocean-ASN 






Count Country AS Organization 
161.35.152.122 1 2 Netherlands Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.66.65 2 4 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.67.107 2 7 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.69.100 2 4 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.77.119 2 6 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.78.92 1 2 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.82.72 3 6 Germany Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.95.234 2 2 Netherlands Digital Ocean-ASN 
161.35.95.69 3 4 Netherlands Digital Ocean-ASN 
167.172.219.157 6 3 United States Digital Ocean-ASN 
202.107.226.2 1 1 China China-net 
 
Table 7. Distribution of ICS sessions by country 
 
B. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TRAFFIC IN EXPERIMENTS 
We used cosine similarity analysis (Dangeti, 2017) to identify distributional 
similarities between experiments. Cosine similarity measures the cosine of the angle 
between two vectors to determine how much they are pointing in the same direction on a 
scale of 0 to 1.  
Dougherty Phase 1 Experiment  1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
 Country 
Percentage 
of Total Country 
Percentage 
of Total Country 
Percentage 





States 41.9 Germany 74.7  Netherlands 31.6 
United 
States 47.1 





States 5.1 Romania 15.8 China 17.6 
4 Singapore 6.6 Romania 3.8 Russia 10.5 Romania 11.8 
5 China 6.4 China 3.8 
United 
States 10.5 Netherlands 5.9 
6 Canada 2.7       
7 Romania 2.0       
8 Russia 1.4       
9 Netherlands 0.7       
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We compared cosine similarity experiments with vectors of four elements (see 
Table 8). Each vector represented average weekly counts of HTTP GET commands, HTTP 
POST commands, other HTTP methods (CONNECT, PROPFID, NONE, and HEAD), and 
all IEC methods including I-format, U-format, and error frames (incorrectly formatted IEC 
messages). The raw data is in Appendix C. The average cosine similarity on counts for 
consecutive weeks was 0.715 for Experiment 1, 0.774 for Experiment 2, and 0.994 for 
Experiment 3. These averages are like standard deviations and can be divided into the 
differences between experiments to provide a measure of significance (see Table 9). As 
can be seen, the results of the experiments were not significantly different because usually 
two standard deviations away from the mean is considered as a minimum for significance. 
Table 8. Cosine similarity for total traffic of each experiment 
 Dougherty Phase 1 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Average cosine 
similarity of total 
traffic for all 
weeks 
0.794 0.715 0.774 0.994 
 
 
Table 9. Measure of significance of total traffic for comparison groups  
 Dougherty versus 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 versus 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 versus 
Experiment 3 
Measure of significance 
of average cosine 
similarity for total 
traffic 
Dougherty - 0.100 
 
Experiment 1 - 0.083 
 
Experiment 2 - 0.284 
 
Experiment 1 - 0.110 Experiment 2 - 0.076 Experiment 3 - 0.221 
 
We used the same method to get the cosine similarity for just IEC 104 methods. 
The elements in these vectors were counts of I-format frames, U-format frames, and error 
frames. The average cosine similarities were 0.996, 0.791, and 0.829 for the three 
experiments (Table 10). The measures of significance are displayed in Table 11, and raw 
data is in Appendix C. 
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Table 10. Cosine similarity for IEC 104 traffic distribution 
 Dougherty Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Average cosine 
similarity of IEC 
104 traffic for all 
weeks 
0.617 0.996 0.791 0.829 
 
 
Table 11. Measure of significance of IEC 104 traffic for comparison groups  
 Dougherty versus 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 versus 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 versus 
Experiment 3 
Measure of significance 
of average cosine 
similarity of IEC 104 
traffic 
Dougherty - 0.614 
 
Experiment 1 - 0.206 
 
Experiment 2 - 0.048 
 
Experiment 1 - 0.381 Experiment 2 -0.259 Experiment 3 - 0.046 
 
C. BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 
We examined how attackers interacted with each of our experiments to identify 
unique behaviors. 
1. ASDU Traffic Analysis 
We studied valid ASDU traffic (packets consisting of correctly formatted I-frame 
and U-frame messages) sent to and accepted by the IEC 104 server. Table 12 shows the 
four IP addresses that sent valid ASDU data frames in Experiment 1. The attacker’s ASDU 
valid interactions in Experiment 1 were consistent: a TCP three-way handshake was 
established, an activation test U-frame was sent to the IEC 104 server, and the server 
responded with a confirmation U-frame. The attacker then sent a U-frame message to start 
data transfer, and then an I-frame interrogation command. The GridPot IEC 104 server 
responded with data generated by the GridLAB-D simulation, and this sequence continued 
until the attacker did a three-way TCP sign off. This differed from what Dougherty 
observed where the attackers never responded with TCP acknowledgement messages and 
did not end the session with a three-way TCP sign off. All the command payloads received 
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by the IEC 104 server in Experiment 1 were identical (see Figure 12). This suggests that 
these may be addresses of Web crawlers like SHODAN searching the Internet for IEC 104 
systems.  
Table 12. Addresses sending valid ASDU traffic to Experiment 1 
IP Address Country Domain Name Number of Sessions 
185.142.236.35 Netherlands wine.census.shodan.io 1 
89.248.167.131 Netherlands mason.census.shodan.io 1 
193.37.255.114 Slovakia ppman.ro 1 
167.172.219.157 United States tab.census.shodan.io 1 
 
Figure 12. Valid ASDU interaction with SHODAN remote host 
Tables 13 and 14 show those IP addresses that had valid ASDU interactions with 
Experiments 2 and 3. The China-based attacker in Experiment 2 established a TCP session, 
exchanged U-frame messages, sent an I-frame message, received an I-frame message from 
the IEC 104 server, and then tried to send another I-frame message, which was identified 
as a spurious retransmission due to having a duplicate ACK of the data frame the host had 
just received. The behavior of this attacker could be a replay attack (Maynard, Et al., 2020, 
p. 6) or could be due to TCP connectivity issues. 
  
34 
Table 13. Addresses sending valid ASDU traffic to Experiment 2 
IP address Country Domain Name Number of Sessions 
106.75.3.52 China ucloud.cn 2 
185.142.236.34 Netherlands hat.census.shodan.io 1 
71.6.167.142 United States census9.shodan.io 1 
Table 14. Valid ASDU interactions with Experiment 3 
IP address Country Domain Name Number of Sessions 
94.102.49.193 Netherlands cloud.census.shodan.io 1 
185.165.190.34 Russia no record 1 
 
D. INTERESTING ATTACKS 
Figure 13 shows a typical dual session HTTP and IEC 104 message, sent to both 
the HTTP and IEC 104 servers for Experiment 1. The IP address associated with this attack 
also sent the same attack to the HTTP port. These attacks try to exploit unprotected 
JavaScript object remote procedure calls (JSON-RPC) in the Ethereum cryptocurrency 
network to steal cryptocurrency (Cheng et al., 2019, p.47). This attack is a known Ethereum 
node probe which tests whether the victim has an insecure HTTP JSON-RPC endpoint.  
 
Figure 13. JSON RPC attack 
Experiment 1 was indirectly affected by a DNS cache poisoning attack (Lazarevski, 
n.d.). Traffic to a China-based website was redirected to our HTML page for displaying 
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the honeypot status. This is likely attributable to DigitalOcean recycling IP addresses, and 
our URL may have once hosted a site with malicious software that attackers use to infect 
other machines. 
 Experiment 3 encountered more HTTP traffic than the other experiments. A single 
URL accounted for approximately one-third of its traffic, which, according to the result of 
an NsLookup query, was registered to our Experiment 3 IP address in October 2017 and 
likely related to a DNS cache poisoning attack (Lazarevski, n.d.). Redirected traffic 
occurred from the start of Experiment 3, so it is likely that the address was poisoned before 
being assigned to us by DigitalOcean.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis explored the cloud deployment of a power-grid honeypot. It changed 
the deployment environments in three ways to see how they affected actions by adversaries. 
Our data could make honeypots more believable and better at collecting information on an 
adversary.  
Experiment 1 showed less IEC 104 traffic in the cloud environment than in the 
physical environment, but similar HTTP traffic volume. This might be due to the rarity of 
ICS systems in the cloud and disinterest by adversaries in attacking them, but this could 
change as ICS systems become more common in the cloud. ICS interactions with the cloud 
environment were more complex than with the physical implementation, suggesting that a 
cloud GridPot implementation may appear more realistic to adversaries. 
Experiment 2 explored the effects of code changes to make the GridPot less 
obvious. Traffic for Experiment 2 was less than that for Experiment 1, but it is unclear 
why; perhaps the novelty effect was wearing off since a less obvious honeypot should be 
more desirable to attack.  
Experiment 3 showed more traffic in an Asia-based deployment than a US-based 
deployment. The rate of interaction in Experiment 3 was significantly higher than 
Dougherty’s Phase 1. However, one-third of the data appears to be due to an existing DNS 
poisoning attack, so what we did cannot explain all the higher volume. This should be an 
issue for anyone using a cloud service that recycles Internet addresses. Most data collected 
was HTTP traffic, showing IEC 104 is less used in the cloud.  
We lacked time to test the deployment of Conpot alone, as described in Chapter 4. 
Using the installation guide we created, which covers both physical Conpot installation 
(Appendix A) and cloud-based Conpot installation (Appendix B), such deployment should 
not be difficult. It might be even better to test Conpot in a more general honeypot 
framework such as T-Pot for both physical and cloud-based deployment. 
Time constraints limited the amount of data we could collect. However, the 
honeypots for Experiments 2 and 3 are still collecting data. That data could be analyzed for 
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changes in intrusion patterns or adversarial behaviors over time, and for finding patterns 
over a longer period.  
We identified a section of code that could be modified to make GridPot less 
obvious. We lacked time to implement it because it would require considerable analysis of 
the linkages between the honeypot and modeling layers of GridPot.  
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APPENDIX A: PHYSICAL CONPOT INSTALLATION 
This appendix contains Chapter 2 of our installation guide, which provides 
instructions for building a virtualized environment on a physical device and installing 
Conpot for local implementation. That chapter is included below. 
 
2    Building Conpot in a Local Linux Environment 
 
2.1 Setting Up Local Linux VM: 
2.1.1 If on VirtualBox, create a new virtual machine with the following 
specifications: 
- Default CPU settings 
- 16 GB RAM (We used 16GB, that much RAM likely unnecessary) 
- 50 GB Storage 
2.1.2 Do installation using an image of Ubuntu 18.04 with a desktop 
environment. For the sake of this installation, we used the username 
“conpot,” you may use any username you prefer.  
2.1.3 Ensure your VM boots up into a desktop environment before resuming.  
 
2.2 Installing Conpot on Local Linux VM: 
2.2.1 Ensure your Ubuntu Installation is up to date: 
- $ sudo apt update 
2.2.2 Install dependencies: 
- $ sudo apt-get install git libsmi2ldbl smistrip libxslt1-dev 
python3.6-dev libevent-dev default-libmysqlclient-dev 
2.2.3 Install virtualenv: 
- $ sudo apt-get install python3-pip 
- $ sudo pip3 install virtualenv 
2.2.4 Create a Virtual Environment (conpot is environment name in this case): 
- $ virtualenv --python=python3.6 conpot 
2.2.5 Activate the environment (‘conpot’ is the environment name in this case): 
- $ source conpot/bin/activate 
2.2.6 Upgrade and install basic tools dependencies within the environment: 
- $ pip install --upgrade pip 
- $ pip install --upgrade setup tools 
- $ pip install cffi 
2.2.7 Install base (table) version of Conpot from PYPI: 
- $ pip install conpot 
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2.2.8 Test Conpot using the testing configuration- You are will verify that the 
conpot boots without issues in the testing configuration. Remember that 
the default and testing templates use inaccurate port numbers (i.e. 8800 for 
http instead of 80). Installation and use directions for a terminal-based 
browser called “lynx” is in section 4.5 of this guide:  
- $ conpot -f --template default 
2.2.8.1 Verify Conpot is up: 
- Open browser and go to “127.0.0.1:8800”  
- You should see a minimal Web page with the word “Technodrome” at 
the top 
- Ensure you can see this before moving on 
- Use CTR+C to shut down the conpot 
 
2.3 Building a Config File: To proceed and operate using the “Default” template 
instead of “Test” template you must build a config file and map it to your instance 
of conpot. 
2.3.1 Find the file “testing.cfg” (Should be at \home\conpot\lib\python3.6\site-
packages\conpot) 
2.3.2 Make a copy of “testing.cfg” and change name to “config.cfg” 
2.3.3 Place your new “config.cfg” in a new location (I placed mine at 
\home\conpot\) 
2.3.4 Open “config.cfg” for editing: 
- $ cd ~/conpot/ 
- $ nano config.cfg  
2.3.5 Make the following changes under [Virtual_file_system] change to: 
- data_fs_url = /tmp/ 
- fs_url = tar:///home/conpot/conpot/lib/python3.6/site-
packages/conpot/data.tar 
- Ensure a data.tar file is in the above location 
2.3.6 Test config.cfg file using default template- You will verify that the conpot 
boots without issues in the default configuration. Remember that the 
default and testing templates use inaccurate port numbers (i.e. 8800 for 
http instead of 80). NOTE: Installation and use directions for a terminal-
based browser called “lynx” is in section 4.5 of this guide:  
- $ conpot –c ~/conpot/config.cfg --template default 
2.3.6.1 Verify Conpot is up: 
- Open browser and go to “127.0.0.1:8800”  
- You should see a minimal Web page with the word “Technodrome” at 
the top 
- Ensure you can see this before moving on 
- Use CTR+C to shut down the conpot 
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2.4 Install and Configure Authbind: To operate the conpot using the correct port 
numbers, ports less than 1024 must by bound. However, a normal user is 
unauthorized to bind ports and conpot will not boot in root. Therefore, Authbind 
allows for the binding of ports without root.  
2.4.1 Install Authbind: 
- $ sudo apt-get install authbind 
2.4.2 Conduct the following steps for the following ports: 21, 69, 80, 102, 161, 
502, 623- NOTE: in step ‘b.’ below our username was conpot, therefore 
substitute in your username: 
- $ sudo touch /etc/authbind/byport/(port#)  (I.e. ~/byport/80 ) 
- $ sudo chown conpot:conpot /etc/authbind/byport/(port#) 
- $ sudo chmod 755 /etc/authbind/byport/(port#) 
NOTE: For port numbers greater than 512, additional verification is 
needed by the system to bind. You must add ‘!’ in front of port 623 in byport 
folder (IPMI will NOT work w/o this step). You will need ‘root’ access to 
make this change. (i.e. /etc/authbind/byport/!623) 
 
2.5 Correct Port Numbers Within Default Template: Most likely because of 
binding authorization, the default template uses modified port numbers. Now that 
you have set up authbind correctly, you may now update your conpot to operate 
from the correct port numbers.  
2.5.1 Navigate to default template folder 
2.5.1.1 If using File Manager: 
- Go to “/home/conpot/lib/python3.6/site-
packages/conpot/templates/default” 
2.5.1.2 If using terminal: 
- $ cd “/home/conpot/lib/python3.6/site-
packages/conpot/templates/default 
2.5.2 Every protocol has a folder, and in said folder is an .xml file bearing its 
name. Need not worry about the ssl folders or files.  
2.5.2.1 In every .xml file update it to ensure the port number in Line 1 
matches the proper port. See Below: 
- BACNET: 47808 
- ENIP: 44818 
- FTP: 21 
- HTTP: 80 
- IPMI: 623 
- MODBUS: 502 
- S7COM: 102 
- SNMP: 161 
- TFTP: 69 
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2.6 Boot Conpot Using the Default Template and Authbind: (NOTE: without 
authbind prefix, you will not have permissions to bind to ports less than 1024) 
NOTE: Installation and use directions for a terminal-based browser called 
“lynx” is in section 4.5 of this guide: 
2.6.1 $ authbind conpot -c ~/conpot/config.cfg --template default 
2.6.1.1 Verify Conpot is up (you are now using the correct port number so just 
the IP should suffice): 
- Open browser and go to “127.0.0.1”  
- You should see a minimal Web page with the word “Technodrome” at 
the top 
- Ensure you can see this before moving on 
 
2.7 Verify Conpot Visibility Outside Your Home/ Local Network: 
2.7.1 Ensure your network is bridged on your Virtual Machine 
- For VirtualBox: Shut down your Ubuntu VM and go to Virtualbox 
- Right click on your VM and select ‘Settings’ 
- In ‘Network’ under ‘Adapter 1’, select ‘Bridged Adapter’ in ‘Attached 
to:’ 
- Click ‘OK’ to save changes and reboot your VM 
2.7.2 Verify your outward facing IP- To verify that your conpot is visible 
outside of your home/local network you must know your IP address. Open 
a browser in your vm and navigate to http://ip4.me. This will tell you your 
outward facing IP.  
2.7.3 Boot up your conpot- Since that you have ended your previous session you 
will initialize your virtual environment before initializing your conpot. 
This will be necessary anytime that you close the terminal window.  
- $ source conpot/bin/activate (conpot was the name of my virtual 
environment)  
- $ authbind conpot -c ~/conpot/config.cfg --template default 
2.7.4 On any other device open a browser and navigate to the IP address you 
acquired in step 2.7(b.). You should see a minimal Web page with the 
word “Technodrome” at the top. If you do not, verify the following: 
- You are using the correct outward facing IP 
- You have boot your conpot with prefix ‘authbind’ 
- You have properly configured bridged adapter on your VM 
- Your local/home network has the appropriate port forwarding on your 
internal firewalls to allow for traffic on the ports listed in section 
2.5.2.1.     
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APPENDIX B: CLOUD-BASED CONPOT INSTALLATION 
This appendix contains Chapter 3 of our installation guide, which provides 
instructions for creating a droplet in the DigitalOcean cloud and installing a virtualized 
Ubuntu 18.04 environment with Conpot for cloud-based use.  
 
3 Building Conpot in a Cloud Environment (DigitalOcean) 
 
3.1 Create a Droplet on DigitalOcean: 
3.1.1 Select “Get Started with a Droplet” on your Project Home page 
3.1.2 Choose an image (Ubuntu 18.04.3 (LTS) x64) 
3.1.3 Choose a plan (Your choice: We chose ‘General Purpose’) 
- 16 GB/ 4 CPUs 
- 50 GB SSD disk 
- 5 TB transfer 
3.1.4 Disk options (Your choice: We chose ‘1x SSD’) 
3.1.5 Add block storage (Your choice: We did NOT ‘Add Volume’) 
3.1.6 Chose a data center region (Your choice: We chose ‘San Francisco’) 
3.1.7 Select additional options 
3.1.7.1 We selected ‘IPv6’ 
3.1.7.2 We selected ‘Monitoring’ 
3.1.7.3 We selected ‘User data’ (add the following code): 
#!/bin/bash 
set -euo pipefail 
USERNAME=nps # TODO: Customize the sudo non-root username 
here 
# Create user and immediately expire password to force a change on 
login 
useradd --create-home --shell “/bin/bash” --groups sudo 
“${USERNAME}” 
passwd --delete “${USERNAME}” 
chage --lastday 0 “${USERNAME}” 
# Create SSH directory for sudo user and move keys over 
home_directory=“$(eval echo ~${USERNAME})” 
mkdir --parents “${home_directory}/.ssh” 
cp /root/.ssh/authorized_keys “${home_directory}/.ssh” 
chmod 0700 “${home_directory}/.ssh” 
chmod 0600 “${home_directory}/.ssh/authorized_keys” 
chown --recursive “${USERNAME}”:”${USERNAME}” 
“${home_directory}/.ssh” 
# Disable root SSH login with password 
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sed --in-place ‘s/^PermitRootLogin.*/PermitRootLogin prohibit-
password/g’ /etc/ssh/sshd_config 
if sshd -t -q; then systemctl restart sshd fi 
3.1.7.4 On Line 4 you can change username (‘nps’) to what you like 
3.1.8 Authentication 
- Select ‘SSH keys’ 
- Select ‘New SSH Key’ 
- Create a key using directions in section 4.1 
- Copy your key created into box labeled ‘SSH key content’ 
- Name your SSH key in the box labeled ‘Name’ 
- Select ‘Add SSH Key’ 
3.1.9 How many Droplets?  
- Your choice (We chose ‘1 droplet’) 
3.1.10 Choose a hostname 
- Your choice  
3.1.11 Add Tags 
- Your choice (We left it empty) 
3.1.12 Select Project 
- Should auto select your account/ project 
3.1.13 Add backups 
- Your choice (We selected to include backups: does incur additional 
charges) 
3.1.14 Select ‘Create Droplet’ 
3.1.15 Boot and login to Droplet 
- (In DigitalOcean) Select ‘Droplets’ in the left column 
- Record the IP address listed for the droplet (you will need this later) 
- Select your droplet (click on the droplet name) 
- Select ‘Access’ 
- Select’ Launch Console’ (as per earlier code in section 3.1.7.3, 
password will be required to change upon login with username) 
 
3.2 Installing Conpot on DigitalOcean: 
3.2.1 Ensure your Ubuntu Installation is up to date: 
- $ sudo apt update 
3.2.2 Install dependencies: 
- $ sudo apt-get install git libsmi2ldbl smistrip libxslt1-dev 
python3.6-dev libevent-dev default-libmysqlclient-dev 
3.2.3 Install virtualenv: 
- $ sudo apt-get install python3-pip 
- $ sudo pip3 install virtualenv 
3.2.4 Create a Virtual Environment (conpot is environment name in this case) 
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- $ virtualenv --python=python3.6 conpot 
3.2.5 Activate the environment (‘conpot’ is the environment name in this case): 
- $ source conpot/bin/activate 
3.2.6 Upgrade and install basic tools dependencies within the environment: 
- $ pip install --upgrade pip 
- $ pip install --upgrade setup tools 
- $ pip install cffi 
3.2.7 Install base (table) version of Conpot from PYPI: 
- $ pip install conpot 
3.2.8 Test Conpot using the testing configuration- You will verify that the 
conpot boots without issues in the testing configuration. Remember that 
the default and testing templates use inaccurate port numbers (i.e. 8800 for 
http instead of 80). NOTE: Only 1 terminal session can be open while 
using the console on DigitalOcean. Recommend running conpot as a 
background process by adding an ‘&’ to the end of the terminal command:  
- $ conpot -f --template default  
Or 
- $ conpot -f --template default & (to run as a background process) 
 
3.2.8.1 Verify Conpot is up: 
- $ ps -a (verify conpot process is running, if ran as background 
process) 
- Using the IP address recorded in section 3.1.15, open local browser 
and go to “1.2.3.4:8800” 
(where 1.2.3.4 is your IP address)  
- You should see a minimal Web page with the word “Technodrome” at 
the top 
- Ensure you can see this before moving on 
3.2.8.2 Shutdown conpot:  
- If conpot was running as a background process: 
$ ps -a 
$ kill -9 <pid listed for conpot from ps -a> (i.e. $ kill -9 1234)  
- If not run as a background process: 
Use CTR+C to shut down the conpot 
 
3.3 Building a Config File: To proceed and operate using the “Default” template 
instead of “Test” template you must build a config file and map it to your instance 
of conpot. 
3.3.1 Find the file “testing.cfg” (Should be at \home\conpot\lib\python3.6\site-
packages\conpot) 
3.3.2 Make a copy of “testing.cfg” and change name to “config.cfg” 
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3.3.3 Place your new “config.cfg” in a new location (I placed mine at 
\home\conpot\) 
3.3.4 Open “config.cfg” for editing: 
- $ cd ~/conpot/ 
- $ nano config.cfg  
3.3.5 Make the following changes under [Virtual_file_system]: 
- data_fs_url = /tmp/ 
- fs_url = tar:///home/conpot/conpot/lib/python3.6/site-
packages/conpot/data.tar 
- NOTE: Ensure a data.tar file is at the above location 
3.3.6 Test config.cfg file using default template- You will verify that the conpot 
boots without issues in the default configuration. NOTE: Only 1 terminal 
session can be open while using the console on DigitalOcean. Recommend 
running conpot as a background process by adding an ‘&’ to the end of 
the terminal command.  
3.3.7 $ conpot –c ~/conpot/config.cfg --template default 
Or 
$ conpot –c ~/conpot/config.cfg --template default & 
(to run as a background process) 
3.3.7.1 Verify Conpot is up: 
- $ ps -a (verify conpot process is running, if ran as background 
process) 
- Using the IP address recorded earlier, open local browser and go to 
“1.2.3.4:8800” 
(where 1.2.3.4 is your IP address)  
- You should see a minimal Web page with the word “Technodrome” at 
the top 
- Ensure you can see this before moving on 
3.3.7.2 Shutdown conpot:  
- If conpot was run as a background process: 
$ ps -a 
$ kill -9 <pid listed for conpot from ps -a> (i.e. $ kill -9 1234)  
- If not run as a background process: 
Use CTR+C to shut down the conpot (if not run as background process) 
 
3.4 Install and Configure Authbind: To operate the conpot using the correct port 
numbers, ports less than 1024 must by bound. However, a normal user is 
unauthorized to bind ports and conpot will not boot in root. Therefore, Authbind 
allows for the binding of ports without root.  
3.4.1 Install Authbind: 
- $ sudo apt-get install authbind 
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3.4.2 Conduct the following steps for the following ports: 21, 69, 80, 102, 161, 
502, 623- NOTE: in step ‘b.’ below our username was conpot, therefore 
substitute in your username:  
- $ sudo touch /etc/authbind/byport/(port#)  (I.e. ~/byport/80 ) 
- $ sudo chown conpot:conpot /etc/authbind/byport/(port#) 
- $ sudo chmod 755 /etc/authbind/byport/(port#) 
NOTE: For port numbers greater than 512, additional verification is 
needed by the system to bind. You must add ‘!’ in front of port 623 in byport 
folder (IPMI will NOT work w/o this step). You will need ‘root’ access to 
make this change. (i.e. /etc/authbind/byport/!623) 
 
3.5 Correct Port Numbers Within Default Template: Most likely because of 
binding authorization, the default template uses modified port numbers. Now that 
you have set up authbind correctly, you may now update your Conpot to operate 
from the correct port numbers.  
3.5.1 Navigate to default template folder: 
- If using File Manager go to “/home/conpot/lib/python3.6/site-
packages/conpot/templates/default” 
- If using terminal:                                                                                     
$ cd “/home/conpot/lib/python3.6/site-  
packages/conpot/templates/default 
3.5.2 Every protocol has a folder, and in said folder is an .xml file bearing its 
name. Need not worry about the ssl folders or files.  
3.5.3 In every .xml file update it to ensure the port number in Line 1 matches 
the proper port. See Below: 
- BACNET: 47808 
- ENIP: 44818 
- FTP: 21 
- HTTP: 80 
- IPMI: 623 
- MODBUS: 502 
- S7COM: 102 
- SNMP: 161 
- TFTP: 69 
 
3.6 Boot Conpot Using the Default Template and Authbind: (NOTE: without 
authbind prefix, you will not have permissions to bind to ports less than 1024) 
NOTE: Only 1 terminal session can be open while using the console on 
DigitalOcean. Recommend running conpot as a background process by adding an 
‘&’ to the end of the terminal command.  
3.6.1 $ authbind conpot -c ~/conpot/config.cfg --template default 
or 
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$ authbind conpot -c ~/conpot/config.cfg --template default &  
(to run as a background process) 
3.6.2 Verify Conpot is up: 
- $ ps -a (verify conpot process is running, if ran as background 
process) 
- Using the IP address recorded earlier, open local browser and go to 
“1.2.3.4” 
(where 1.2.3.4 is your IP address)  
- You should see a minimal Web page with the word “Technodrome” at 
the top 
- Ensure you can see this before moving on 
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APPENDIX C: COSINE SIMILARITY DATA 
The tables below show the data used to conduct the cosine similarity analysis in 
Section V.C. These tables contain weekly counts of HTTP and IEC methods for all 
experiments, values used for the vector elements in cosine similarity, weekly cosine 
similarity results for HTTP and IEC method distribution, and IEC only method distribution. 
 
Dougherty weekly HTTP and IEC 104 method counts 







1 1 235 12 0 4 19 0 0 1 2 
2 2 131 49 1 3 11 0 83 1 4 
3 3 2075 701 0 3 49 0 1 0 1 
4 8 559 779 3 6 84 0 2 3 7 
5 8 813 1392 1 3 90 0 2 0 2 
6 4 461 776 1 4 49 0 83 1 5 
7 5 359 161 4 5 79 0 9 1 4 
8 7 807 1510 0 2 31 0 1 1 7 
9 1 421 902 1 1 24 0 213 0 4 
10 3 208 20 0 1 9 0 1 0 1 
11 8 369 53 1 4 55 0 6 1 4 
12 2 1288 2405 4 4 139 0 2 0 1 
13 5 397 131 0 1 20 0 1 2 5 
14 0 24 1 0 0 0 0 13 0 6 
15 8 536 735 1 3 0 0 0 3 8 
16 1 439 728 0 2 46 0 2 0 1 
17 2 852 1576 14 10 105 1 1 2 5 
18 0 78 3 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 
19 1 141 7 0 0 44 0 131 0 1 
20 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
21 0 523 73 0 6 135 0 2 3 7 
22 2 899 1465 0 4 83 0 6 0 2 
 
Experiment 1 weekly HTTP and IEC 104 method counts 







1 1 3153 64 3 2 78 0 65 3 8 
2 6 789 890 0 0 25 0 56 0 2 
3 6 295 38 1 5 19 0 33 1 3 
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Experiment 2 weekly HTTP and IEC 104 method counts 







1 0 529 831 0 2 17 0 2 3 4 
2 2 610 43 19 11 162 3 9 1 7 
3 2 680 747 1 7 29 0 2 0 0 
 
Experiment 3 weekly HTTP and IEC 104 method counts 







1 0 6913 779 0 16 54 0 1 1 2 
2 6 9388 88 4 41 91 0 2 0 3 
3 4 9668 1267 1 39 126 0 11 1 3 
 
Average weekly HTTP and IEC 104 method counts 





Dougherty 3.227 528.182 612.682 1.409 3 50.136 0.045 25.409 0.864 3.5 
Experiment 
1 
4.333 1412.333 330.667 1.333 2.333 40.667 0 51.333 1.333 4.333 
Experiment 
2 
1.333 606.333 540.333 6.667 6.667 69.333 1 4.333 1.333 3.667 
Experiment 
3 
3.333 8656.333 711.333 1.667 32 90.333 0 4.667 0.667 2.667 
 
Average method counts used for HTTP and IEC 104 cosine similarity 
comparisons 
Experiment GET POST Other Methods IEC 
Dougherty 528.182 612.682 57.818 29.455 
Experiment 1 1412.333 330.667 48.667 57 
Experiment 2 478 304 81.333 34.667 










Weekly cosine similarity for individual experiments 
Week Dougherty Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
1 NaN NaN NaN NaN 
2 0.815 0.679 0.571 0.995 
3 0.845 0.751 0.978 0.993 
4 0.81    
5 0.995    
6 0.995    
7 0.808    
8 0.774    
9 0.976    
10 0.499    
11 0.992    
12 0.592    
13 0.725    
14 0.765    
15 0.496    
16 0.995    
17 0.999    
18 0.501    
19 0.746    
20 0.744    
21 0.984    
22 0.627    
 
Weekly average HTTP and IEC 104 cosine similarity per experiment 
Dougherty Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 






Weekly average IEC cosine similarity per experiment 
Dougherty Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
0.617 0.996 0.791 0.829 
 
IEC weekly cosine similarity for individual experiments 
Week Dougherty Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
1 NaN NaN NaN NaN 
2 0.048 0.992 0.795 0.906 
3 0.740 0.999 0.786 0.751 
4 0.808    
5 0.808    
6 0.748    
7 0.933    
8 0.538    
9 0.158    
10 0.720    
11 0.971    
12 0.983    
13 0.572    
14 0.548    
15 0.392    
16 0.418    
17 0.572    
18 NaN    
19  NaN    
20 NaN    
21 NaN    
22 0.522    
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